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I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Joshua A. Douglas’s intriguing article in the 
Vanderbilt Law Review provides much-needed focus on the largely 
overlooked provisions in state constitutions that establish voting-
related rights.1 He points out that the United States Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board2
 
makes it 
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in federal constitutional challenges to 
state laws that regulate the electoral process, such as voter 
identification requirements.3 Consequently, plaintiffs seeking to 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, Barry University. 
Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, 2012–14; J.D., Yale Law School, 
2003; A.B., Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 
2000. The author is the former Special Assistant to the General Counsel of the Army. He 
represented the Intervenor-Defendants in League of Women Voters Educ. Network, Inc. v. 
Walker, 834 N.W.2d 393 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 851 N.W.2d 302 (Wis. July 31, 2014), and 
NAACP v. Walker, 2012AP652, 2014 Wis. LEXIS 534 (July 31, 2014), as well as an amicus in 
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012), in which the issues discussed in this Article 
were litigated.  He also was counsel of record in the U.S. Supreme Court for Shaun McCutcheon 
in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). The author would like to thank Brynn E. 
Applebaum and the staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc  for their superb editorial 
assistance. 
 1. Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89 
(2014). 
 2.  553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 3.  Douglas, supra note 1, at 92–93. 
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challenge electoral regulations have begun to pursue claims under 
state constitutions instead. 
Professor Douglas argues that state constitutional provisions 
concerning voting and elections generally provide greater protection 
against election regulations or voting requirements than the U.S. 
Constitution,4
 
which does not expressly address most types of 
election-related rights with the same specificity.5 Douglas contends 
that, when a state court declines to provide greater protection for 
voting rights under its own constitution than under the U.S. 
Constitution, it typically is because the court is erroneously construing 
the documents in “lockstep” with each other, effectively ignoring the 
state constitution’s additional voting-related provisions.6
 
He argues 
that a state election law which establishes requirements that a 
person must satisfy in order to vote imposes “additional 
qualification[s]” for voting, is presumptively invalid, and generally 
should be struck down under the state constitution.7 
I respectfully disagree with Professor Douglas’s analysis in 
several respects. State constitutions—and in particular their 
qualifications clauses—generally do not provide stronger protection 
for voting rights than the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, contrary to 
Professor Douglas’s contentions, the congruence between state and 
federal constitutional protections for voting is not the result of states 
reading their constitutions in lockstep with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. If anything, the opposite is 
true. The standards that the modern Supreme Court has adopted for 
determining the constitutionality of election laws are consistent with 
over a century-and-a-half of state constitutional precedents that long 
predate most federal voting rights cases. 
Most state courts have long interpreted their constitutions 
in general, and qualifications clauses in particular, as permitting 
legislatures to impose reasonable regulations on the voting process to 
 
 4.  Id. at 104–05; cf. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights , 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 504–05 (1977) (arguing that the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution is not “mechanically applicable . . . when 
interpreting counterpart state [constitutions’] guarantees”). 
 5.  The U.S. Constitution specifies that any person who is quali fied to vote for “the most 
numerous Branch of the State Legislature” must also be deemed qualified to vote in elections for 
the House of Representatives and Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII. It also 
imposes penalties on states that deny or abridge the right to vote, id. amend. XIV, § 2, and 
provides that people may not be deprived of the right to vote based on certain specified grounds. 
See id. amend. XV (race); amend. XIX (gender); amend. XXIV (failure to pay poll tax); amend. 
XXVI (age, for people who are at least 18 years old). 
 6.  Douglas, supra note 1, at 106, 110, 124. 
 7.  Id. at 137–38. 
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ensure the integrity of elections. They consistently have held that 
qualified electors who fail to comply with statutory processes or 
requirements for voting may be required to vote provisionally or else 
be prohibited from participating in an election; such requirements 
do not constitute impermissible new “qualifications.”8 This approach 
appropriately balances the two equally important and complementary 
aspects of the fundamental right to vote: the “affirmative” right to cast 
a ballot, and what may be considered the “defensive” right to have 
that ballot counted and be given full effect, without being diluted by 
fraudulent or otherwise improper votes.9 Thus, due to well-
established state-level precedents that are unrelated to the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, the pivot to state 
constitutional challenges to election laws is unlikely to succeed. 
Additionally, even when state constitutions provide greater 
protection for the right to vote than the U.S. Constitution, they cannot 
limit the scope of a legislature’s authority to regulate federal 
elections. The U.S. Constitution confers the power to regulate federal 
elections directly on state legislatures—not on states as a whole—
rendering state constitutions legally incapable of imposing 
substantive restrictions on the scope of that authority. A state 
constitution may not limit a power that originates in the U.S. 
Constitution. Thus, even where voter identification laws or other 
election restrictions might violate state constitutions as applied to 
state and local elections, they remain valid and enforceable under the 
U.S. Constitution as applied to federal elections. 
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONS, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE, AND 
VOTER “QUALIFICATIONS” 
Although most state constitutions contain numerous clauses 
expressly relating to voting, they generally do not provide 
substantially greater protection for the right to vote than the U.S. 
Constitution. This is especially true of state constitutions’ 
qualifications clauses, upon which Professor Douglas primarily rests 
his argument.10
 
This congruence between state and federal 
constitutions is not the result of state courts choosing to interpret 
their constitutions in “lockstep” with the U.S. Constitution, as 
 
 8.  See, e.g., infra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
 9.  Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226 (1974); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
555 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962). 
 10.  Douglas, supra note 1, at 132–33, 136–38. 
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Professor Douglas maintains.11
 
Rather, the test that the Supreme 
Court has adopted is consistent with the standards that most states 
have adopted over the past century and a half. State courts have 
long recognized that, consistent with their respective 
constitutions, qualified electors may be required to comply with a 
range of requirements and processes to maintain good order, 
promote efficiency, engender public confidence, and preserve the 
integrity of the electoral process.  
As Professor Douglas recognizes,12
 
the Supreme Court’s rulings 
in Anderson v. Celebrezze13
 
and Burdick v. Takushi14
 
establish the 
modern standard for determining the permissibility of most election 
laws under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution. The Anderson-Burdick test provides that laws imposing 
“severe restrictions” on voters are subject to strict scrutiny and 
generally invalid.15 In all other cases, the Court balances the interests 
that an election regulation seeks to promote against the burden it 
imposes on constitutional rights.16 
The Anderson-Burdick test recognizes that the “government 
must play an active role in structuring elections” and impose 
“substantial regulation . . . if they are to be fair and honest and [reflect] 
some sort of order, rather than chaos . . . .”17
 
Election laws “will 
invariably impose some burden upon individual voters,” but such 
burdens do not render them unconstitutional.18 Under the Anderson-
Burdick standard, most election laws are constitutionally 
permissible.19 
The Supreme Court’s relative permissiveness toward election 
regulations is consistent with its recognition that the fundamental 
right to vote is comprised of two components: the “affirmative” right 
to vote, or the right to cast a ballot, and what may be considered the 
“defensive” right to vote, which is a person’s right to have his or her 
ballot be counted and “given full value and effect, without being 
 
 11.  Id. at 106, 110, 124. 
 12.  Id. at 98. 
 13.  460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 14.  504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
 15.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793. 
 16.  Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 
 17.  Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 434 (“[W]hen a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the 
State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.” 
(quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788)). 
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diluted or distorted by the casting of fraudulent” or otherwise invalid 
ballots.20
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that a person’s right to 
vote is “denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of [his or 
her] vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise 
of the franchise.”21
 
Although the need to protect the “defensive” right 
to vote is likely at its apex with regard to absentee ballots, which are 
especially susceptible to fraud,22 this right extends to all votes, 
regardless of the medium through which they are cast. 
In rulings dating back to the 1800s, many states have 
interpreted their respective constitutions—and, in particular, their 
qualifications clauses—as imposing restrictions similar to the 
Anderson-Burdick standard.  These rulings generally are not the 
result of “lockstepping” with the U.S. Constitution, but rather stem 
from independent determinations of the scope of state legislatures’ 
authority to regulate the conduct of elections.  
For example, the Iowa Supreme Court held in 1869: 
Th[e] section of the Constitution [which] defines who shall be an elector .  .  .  fixes 
the minimum age of voters, and the minimum length of residence. The legislature 
cannot change these particulars . . . . Whoever possesses the qualifications there 
mentioned is an elector; and his right to vote .  .  .  [cannot be] divest[ed]. . . . [I]t is 
equally clear . . . that the legislature may regulate the exercise of this right, leaving the 
right itself untouched. . . . Every citizen who is entitled to vote is interested in having 
excluded from the box the ballots of those not entitled. To prevent fraudulent voting, 
to insure the purity of the ballot-box, are objects which fall properly within the 
province of legislative power and duty. . . . [T]he legislature, while it must leave the 
constitutional qualifications intact, and cannot add new ones, may, nevertheless, 
prescribe regulations to determine whether a given person who proposes to vote 
possesses the required qualifications.23 
 
 20.  Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226 (1974). 
 21.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 208 (holding 
that the right to vote is violated by “dilution” of a person’s votes through means such as “stuffing 
of the ballot box”). 
 22.  See, e.g., U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, ELECTION CRIMES: AN INITIAL REVIEW 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 6 (2006); NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, 
TO ENSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE 44 (2001); John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The 
Absentee Ballot and the Secret Ballot: Challenges for Election Reform , 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
483, 512–13 (2003); William T. McCauley, Florida Absentee Voter Fraud: Fashioning an 
Appropriate Judicial Remedy, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 632 (2000); Daniel P. Tokaji & Ruth 
Colker, Absentee Voting by People With Disabilities: Promoting Access and Integrity , 38 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1015, 1043 (2007); Tova Andrea Wang, Competing Values or False Choices : 
Coming to Consensus on the Election Reform Debate in Washington State and the Country , 29 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353, 389–90 (2005). 
 23.  Edmonds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa 267, 271–72 (1869); see also Lane v. Mitchell, 133 N.W. 
381, 382 (Iowa 1911) (“[S]uch provision undoubtedly leaves it to the Legislature to regulate the 
exercise of the right, and to provide a method for determining whether persons offering to vote 
possess the required qualifications.”) . 
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Likewise, the Delaware Chancery Court explained in 1922, 
“When we speak of the qualifications of a voter, we mean to refer to 
those things which must exist as going to make of him a voter, as 
conferring on him the absolute right to be placed among the class 
of persons which the law creates and calls voters.”24 Statutes that 
simply require people to provide “evidenc[e]” that they are qualified to 
vote are “an entirely different thing.”25 
Such rulings are fairly representative of how courts throughout 
the nation historically have construed their constitutions’ 
qualifications clauses. The Kentucky Supreme Court, for example, 
writes that a “qualified” voter will not be “disenfranchise[d]” if 
election officers require “proof of his identity.”26
 
According to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, “[w]hile the Legislature 
cannot change in any particular the qualifications required to enable 
one to vote, it may make reasonable rules and regulations for 
ascertaining those who possess such qualifications.”27
 
Likewise, 
under Kansas Supreme Court precedent, requiring people to provide 
“proof” so that election officials may “ascertain who and who are not 
entitled to vote” is “not in any true sense imposing an additional 
qualification.”28 Thus, it is broadly recognized that, under state 
constitutions’ qualifications clauses, there is an important distinction 
between laws that “add to the constitutional qualifications of voters” 
and those that “merely prescribe a procedure by which frauds may be 
prevented and mistakes avoided on election day.”29 These standards 
seem largely consistent with the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick 
test. 
The voter identification cases from Pennsylvania and 
Wisconsin,
 
upon which Professor Douglas primarily relies,30 further 
bolster this point. In Applewhite v. Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of 
Pennsylvania’s voter identification law31 in a ruling that the 
 
 24.  McComb v. Robelen, 116 A. 745, 747 (Del. Ch. 1922). 
 25.  Id. (holding that laws requiring otherwise eligible voters to register before voting do not 
improperly establish new “qualifications” for voting); see also Brennan v. Black, 104 A.2d 777, 
786 (Del. 1954) (distinguishing between a “qualification” for voting and a requirement that 
people provide “evidence of qualification”). 
 26.  Yates v. Collins, 82 S.W. 282, 284 (Ky. 1904). 
 27.  In re Opinion of the Justices, 143 N.E. 142, 144 (Mass. 1924). 
 28.  State v. Butts, 2 P. 618, 621 (Kan. 1884). 
 29.  Duprey v. Anderson, 518 P.2d 807, 808–09 (Colo. 1974). 
 30.  Douglas, supra note 1, at 106. 
 31.  No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 757 (Pa. Commw. Aug. 15, 
2012), vacated 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012), modified on reh’g, 2012 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 749 
(Oct. 2, 2012). 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court later vacated for further factfinding.32 
Professor Douglas contends that, although the Commonwealth Court 
“discussed various Pennsylvania cases, it consistently fell back on 
[ the  U.S. Supreme  Court ’s vo ter identif ication ruling in]  
Crawford for its substantive analysis.”33
 
He goes on to maintain that 
the court “implicitly used the lockstep approach to reject the plaintiff’s 
challenge to the voter [identification] law.”34 
I read Applewhite differently. The court begins its discussion of 
the voter identification law’s constitutionality with a detailed, 
nineteen-page analysis of eight state court precedents dating back to 
1868 that specifically construe the state constitution.35
 
Quoting the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 1869 ruling in Patterson v. Barlow, the 
Commonwealth Court held: 
The power to legislate on the subject of elections, to provide the boards of officers, and to 
determine their duties, carries with it the power to prescribe the evidence of the identity 
and the qualifications of the voters. The [plaintiffs’] error is in assuming that the true 
electors are excluded, because they may omit to avail themselves of the means of 
proving their identity and their qualifications.36 
Thus, Applewhite rests primarily on longstanding state court 
precedents, not the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S.  
Constitution. 
Professor Douglas also cites the trial court’s injunction of 
Wisconsin’s voter identification statute in League of Women Voters 
Education Network, Inc. v. Walker as an example of a state court 
properly affording state constitutional provisions “primacy” over the 
U.S. Constitution’s right to vote.37
 
That ruling was subsequently 
 
 32.  Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. 2012). The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court was concerned that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation was not making free 
voter identification cards freely available, as the voter identification statute expressly required. 
Id. at 2–3 (quoting Act of Mar. 14, 2012, P.L. 195, No. 18, § 2 (codified at Pa. Stat. § 2626(b))). 
 33.  Douglas, supra note 1, at 107. 
 34.  Id. at 108. 
 35.  Applewhite, 2012 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 757, at *33–51 (citing Mixon v. 
Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 445, 449–50 (Pa. Commw. 2000) (en banc); Martin v. Haggerty, 
548 A.2d 371, 374 (Pa. Commw. 1988) (en banc); Ray v. Commonwealth, 442 Pa. 606 (1971); 
Winston v. Moore, 91 A. 520, 522 (Pa. 1914); In re Independence Party Nomination, 57 A. 344, 
345 (Pa. 1904); Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. 54, 83 (1869); McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. 109, 111 
(1868); Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. 338, 347 (1868)). 
 36.  Applewhite, 2012 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 757, at *38–39 (quoting Patterson, 60 
Pa. at 83). 
 37.  League of Women Voters Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11- CV- 4669, 2012 WL 
763586 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012), rev’d, 834 N.W.2d 393 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 851 
N.W.2d 302 (Wis. July 31, 2014). 
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repudiated, however, by both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
 
and the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court.38 
The appellate rulings in League of Women Voters upholding 
the state’s voter identification law were not based on federal courts’ 
narrow interpretations of the right to vote under the U.S. 
Constitution, but rather long-established Wisconsin cases construing 
the state constitution.39 The Court of Appeals relegated Crawford to a 
footnote, stating that it saw “no reason to discuss” the ruling,40 while 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court briefly touched on Crawford only after a 
detailed and much lengthier discussion of its own precedents.41 
Both appellate courts placed special emphasis on a Wisconsin 
Supreme Court ruling from 1859 that the trial court failed to discuss: 
State ex rel. Cothren v. Lean.42 
 
Cothren upheld the constitutionality of 
a state law permitting election officials at a polling place to challenge 
a person’s eligibility to vote and question her about it.43 The court held 
that the law did not “prescrib[e] any qualifications for electors 
different from those provided for in the constitution,” but instead 
enabled election officials “to ascertain whether the person offering to 
vote possessed the qualifications required by [the constitution].”44 
Holding that the legislature was “certainly . . . competent” to enact 
such a law, the court explained: 
The necessity of preserving the purity of the ballot box, is too obvious for comment, 
and the danger of its invasion too familiar to need suggestion. While, therefore, it is 
incompetent for the legislature to add any new qualifications for an elector, it is clearly 
within its province to require any person offering to vote, to furnish such proof as it 
deems requisite, that he is a qualif[i]ed elector.45 
Based on precedents such as this, both the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals and Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the trial 
court’s attempt to afford “primacy” to the state constitution by 
 
 38. Id. In a companion case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the State may not refuse 
to issue a voter identification card to a person on the grounds that he or she has not paid for a birth 
certificate, effectively requiring the State to eliminate fees for  birth certificates.  Milwaukee Branch 
of the NAACP v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 262, 279–80 (Wis. July 31, 2014). 
 39.  League of Women Voters , 834 N.W.2d at 405–13; League of Women Voters , 851 N.W.2d 
at 307–311. 
 40.  League of Women Voters , 834 N.W.2d at 398 n.2. 
 41.  See League of Women Voters , 851 N.W.2d at 314–16. 
 42.  See League of Women Voters , 834 N.W.2d at 406 (citing State ex rel. Cothren v. Lean, 9 
Wis. *279, *283–84 (1859)); League of Women Voters , 851 N.W.2d at 310–11 (citing Cothren, 9 
Wis. at *283–84). 
 43.  Cothren, 9 Wis. at *283. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at *283–84. 
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construing it more broadly than the U.S. Constitution ran afoul of 
over 150 years of contrary state law.46 
Thus, while exceptions exist,47
 
most state constitutions grant 
legislatures the same authority to establish mandatory procedures 
and requirements for voting as the Supreme Court’s Anderson-
Burdick test. Such interpretations are not the result of state courts’ 
“lockstep” adherence to federal court rulings, however. Instead, they 
trace back to longstanding state court precedents that balance the two 
complementary aspects of the fundamental right to vote: the 
“affirmative” right to cast a vote and the “defensive” right to have that 
vote be given full effect, without being diluted or nullified by 
fraudulent or otherwise improper ballots. 
These cases also call into question Professor Douglas’s broad 
interpretation of state constitutions’ qualifications clause provisions. 
He contends that “courts should deem a law that adds an additional 
voter qualification beyond what the state constitution allows to be 
presumptively invalid.”48 Courts therefore should “require states to 
justify burdens on the right to vote with specific evidence tied to the 
legislature’s authority under the state constitution.”49 As discussed 
above, however, the simple fact that a voter must comply with a 
statute in order to vote in a particular election—for example, by 
showing up at the correct polling location or arriving before closing 
time—does not mean that the law establishes a new voter 
 
 46.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Small v. Bosacki, 143 N.W. 175, 176 (Wis. 1913) (“It is competent 
for the legislature to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for the exercise of the elective 
franchise. To do so infringes upon no constitutional rights.”); State ex rel. Wood v. Baker, 38 
Wis. 71, 87 (1875) (“The voter may assert his right [to vote], if he will, by proof that he has it; 
may vote, if he will, by reasonable compliance with the law. His right is unimpaired; and if he 
be dis[en]franchised, it is not by force of the statute, but by his own voluntary refusal of proof 
that he is enfranchised by the constitution.” ) .  See also State ex rel. O’Neill v. Trask, 115 N.W. 
823, 825 (Wis. 1908) (upholding voter registration requirements because “they are not 
unreasonable and are consistent with the present right to vote as secured by the Constitution”) ; 
cf. Dells v. Kennedy, 49 Wis. 555, 558 (1880) (holding that an election requirement which 
“deprive[s] a fully qualified elector of his right to vote at an election, without his fault and 
against his will, and require[s] of him what is impracticable or impossible” is “as void[] as if it 
directly and arbitrarily disfranchised him . . . or required  of an elector qualifications additional 
to those named in the constitution”) ; State ex rel. Knowlton v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308, 315–16 
(1856) (“[B]y requiring a residence of thirty days in the town where the elector offers to vote, 
the legislature have added a qualification not contained in the constitution, and which is 
repugnant to its provisions.”). 
 47.  See, e.g., Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 212 (Mo. 2006) (“Due to the more 
expansive and concrete protections of the right to vote under the Missouri Constitution, voting 
rights are an area where our state constitution provides greater protection than its federal 
counterpart.”). 
 48.  Douglas, supra note 1, at 94. 
 49.  Id. at 95. 
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“qualification.”50 Thus, to the extent plaintiffs wish to challenge 
election regulations under state constitutions, they generally should 
rely on provisions other than qualifications clauses.51 
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONS, STATE LEGISLATURES, AND  
FEDERAL ELECTIONS 
Another concern with Professor Douglas’s call to challenge 
state election laws under state constitutional provisions is that a 
state constitution cannot limit the substantive scope of a legislature’s 
authority to regulate federal elections. Even if a state election law 
violates a state constitutional provision, it remains valid as applied to 
federal elections.52  
The U.S. Constitution expressly grants state legislatures 
(rather than the States themselves) the power to “prescribe[ ]” the 
 
 50.  See, e.g., supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text; cf. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 835 (1995) (stating that provisions which “regulate[] election 
procedures . . . [do] not even arguably impose any substantive qualification rendering a class of 
potential candidates ineligible for ballot position” or public office). 
 51.  For example, fourteen constitutions contain provisions, which lack an express analogue 
in the U.S. Constitution, stating that “no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere with 
the right of suffrage.”  ARIZ. CONST., art. II, § 21; ARK. CONST., art. III, § 2; COLO. CONST., art. II, 
§ 5; IDAHO CONST., art. I, § 19; MO. CONST., art. I, § 25; MONT. CONST., art. II, § 13; N.M. CONST., 
art. II, § 8; OKLA. CONST., art. II, § 4; id. art. III, § 5; PA. CONST., art. I, § 5; S.C. CONST., art. II, § 
2; S.D. CONST., art. VI, § 19; id. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST., art. I, § 17; WASH. CONST., art. I, § 
19; WYO. CONST., art. I, § 27.   
 52.  A law that violates a state constitutional provision may not be enforced during 
elections where only state or local offices are on the ballot. In contrast, when both state and 
federal offices are on the ballot, the law may be applied to the federal races, and voters may be 
permitted or required to comply with it to vote for federal offices. Because the law may not be 
applied to the state and local offices in that election, some people may be permitted to vote only 
for certain offices.  See, e.g., In re Act Providing for Soldiers’ Voting, 37 Vt. 665 (1864) (holding 
that a state law allowing soldiers stationed outside of the State to cast absentee ballots violated 
the state constitution as applied to elections for state and local offices, but was constitutional and 
enforceable as applied to congressional and presidential elections). Compare In re Opinion of 
Justices, 44 N.H. 633, 636 (1863) (holding that state law permitting soldiers stationed outside the state 
to cast absentee ballots for state and local offices violated the state constitution and was unenforceable), 
with In re Opinion of Justices, 45 N.H. 595, 601 (1864) (holding that state law permitting soldiers 
stationed outside of the state to cast absentee ballots for federal offices was valid under the U.S. 
Constitution and enforceable). Cf. Ariz. Op. Att’y Gen., No. I13-011, at 2 (Oct. 7, 2013), available 
at https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/sites/all/docs/Opinions/2013/I13-011.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/852G-E3J9 (concluding that voters who registered pursuant to forms that 
satisfied federal requirements, but not state requirements, were eligible only to vote in federal 
races, and not state or local races); Kobach: Some Kansans Will Vote for Federal Candidates 
Only, TOPEKA CAPITAL J., June 10, 2014, available at http://cjonline.com/news/state/2014-06-
10/kobach-some-kansans-will-vote-federal-candidates-only, archived at http://perma.cc/CDD2-
7ZQ7 (“Kansas voters who registered using a national form without providing proof of U.S. 
citizenship will be given full provisional ballots during the Aug. 5 primary elections —but only 
the votes they cast in federal races will actually be counted . . . .”). 
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“times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and 
Representatives.”53
 
It likewise provides that “[e]ach State shall 
appoint” presidential electors (i.e., members of the Electoral College) 
“in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”54
 
These 
“express delegations of power” specifically to state legislatures55
 
grant them the “authority to provide a complete code” for federal 
elections, including but not limited to laws for the “protection of 
voters” and the “prevention of fraud and corrupt practices.”56 Thus, 
when a legislature enacts a law that applies to federal elections, it “is 
not acting solely under the authority given it by the people of the 
State, but by virtue of a direct grant of authority” under these federal 
constitutional provisions.57 
A state legislature’s power under the U.S. Constitution to 
regulate federal elections is, of course, subject to various substantive 
limitations set forth throughout that document,58 such as the 
Fourteenth Amendment,
 
as well as Congress’s constitutional 
authority to override states’ decisions and impose uniform procedures 
and requirements for federal elections.59
 
Additionally, a state 
legislature must exercise its power “in accordance with the method 
which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments,”60 meaning 
that state laws governing federal elections are subject to 
gubernatorial veto61
 
or even being overruled by popular referendum,62
 
to the extent the state constitution includes those contingencies in its 
legislative process. 
Although laws governing federal elections must be enacted 
through the “legislative process” set forth in the state constitution,63
 
that principle does not suggest that a state constitution may impose 
substantive restrictions on the content of such statutes.64 The 
 
 53.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (hereafter, “Elections Clause”) . 
 54.  Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (hereafter, “Presidential Electors Clause”) . 
 55.  U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 805. 
 56.  Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). 
 57.  Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000); see also Cook v. 
Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001) (“[T]he States may regulate the incidents of [federal] elections 
. . . only within the exclusive delegation of power under the Elections Clause.”). 
 58.  Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986). 
 59.  See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (congressional elections); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 
U.S. 112, 124 (1970) (presidential elections). 
 60.  Smiley, 285 U.S. at 367. 
 61.  Id. at 368. 
 62.  Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 568 (1916). 
 63.  Smiley, 285 U.S. at 368. 
 64.  See James C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over 
Presidential Elections, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 504 (1962) (“[S]tate legislatures are 
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Supreme  Court has declared that the  U.S. Constitution’s 
delegation of power specifically to state legislatures to regulate 
federal elections “operate[s] as a limitation upon the State in respect 
of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power,” including 
through “any provision in the state constitution in that regard.”65 
That is, a state constitution cannot restrict the scope of the power and 
discretion that the U.S. Constitution bestows on the state legislature 
to regulate the manner in which federal elections are conducted.66 
State courts have upheld and enforced state laws governing the 
conduct of federal elections under the U.S. Constitution’s Elections 
Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, despite the fact that those 
laws squarely violated state constitutional provisions. In In re 
Plurality Elections, for example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
considered whether candidates for presidential elector and the U.S. 
House of Representatives needed to receive a plurality or a 
majority of votes in order to win.67 Article VIII, Section 10 of the 
Rhode Island Constitution provided that a majority of votes was 
necessary for a candidate to be declared the winner “in all elections.”68 
State law, however, permitted candidates for federal office to prevail 
upon receiving only a plurality of votes.69 
 
limited by constitutional provisions for veto, referendum, and initiative in prescribing the 
manner of choosing presidential electors, but . . . state constitutional provisions concerning 
suffrage qualifications and the manner of choosing electors do not limit the substantive 
terms of legislation.”). 
 65.  McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892); see Nelson Lund, The Unbearable 
Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219, 1234 (2002) (“McPherson v. Blacker  . . 
. had suggested (without deciding) that state constitutions are not authorized to constrain 
state legislatures in the special context of choosing presidential electors.” (emphasis in 
original)); Joseph R. Wyatt II, The Lessons of the Hayes-Tilden Election Controversy: Some 
Suggestions for Electoral College Reform, 8 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 617, 624 n.30 (1977) 
(“Although the states are limited in their regulation of the manner of selecting electors, language 
in McPherson v. Blacker indicates that a state constitution may not circumscribe the legislature’s 
range of choice.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 66.  See Notes, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 87 (1937) (“Since the grant of power [over 
federal elections] is derived from the [U.S.] Constitution, not even the provisions of the state 
constitutions can limit the state legislatures in their selection of presidential electors or in their 
control over the election of national legislators.” (internal citation omitted)); Walter Clark, The 
Electoral College and Presidential Suffrage, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 741 (1917) (“[T]he 
exercise of such power [to regulate presidential elections] is given to the state legislature 
subject to no restriction from the state constitution.”). But see Hayward H. Smith, History of the 
Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731 (2001) (arguing that 
there is neither an originalist nor normative basis for permitting a state legislature to act 
independently of its state constitution with regard to presidential elections). 
 67.  In re Plurality Elections, 8 A. 881, 881 (R.I. 1887). 
 68.  Id. at 882 (quoting R.I. CONST., art. VIII, § 10). 
 69.  Id. 
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The state supreme court concluded that a candidate for 
presidential elector or Congress needed to receive only a plurality of 
votes to prevail, even though the Rhode Island Constitution purported 
to require a majority.70 It held that Article VIII, Section 10 of the 
Rhode Island Constitution violated the U.S. Constitution’s Elections 
Clause and Presidential Electors Clause as applied to congressional 
and presidential elections and therefore was “of no effect” with regard 
to such races.71
 
The court explained that the state constitution 
improperly “impose[d] a restraint upon the power of prescribing the 
manner of holding [federal] elections[,] which is given to the 
legislature by the Constitution of the United States without 
restraint.”72 Because state laws regulating federal elections are 
enacted under a state legislature’s power directly from the U.S. 
Constitution, they are valid and enforceable “regardless of” any 
contrary provision in a state constitution.73 
Likewise, in State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court discussed a provision of the Nebraska Constitution 
that provided, “All elections shall be free; and there shall be no 
hindrance or impediment to the right of qualified voter to exercise the 
elective franchise.”74 The court held that it was “unnecessary . . . to 
consider whether or not there is a conflict between the method of 
appointment of presidential electors directed by the Legislature and 
th[at] state constitutional provision.”75 It explained that, under the 
Presidential Electors Clause, a state constitution “may not operate to 
‘circumscribe the legislative power’ granted by the Constitution of the 
United States.”76 
Several state courts reached the same conclusion regarding 
laws that permitted members of the military who were serving away 
from home on Election Day to cast absentee votes. The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court held that the state constitution could 
pose no obstacle to a state law authorizing absentee voting in 
presidential and congressional elections, because: 
 
 70.  Id. at 881–83. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 881. 
 73.  Id.; see also PG Publ. Co. v. Aichele, 902 F. Supp. 2d 724, 747–48 (W.D. Pa. 2012) 
(noting that the Pennsylvania legislature’s authority to regulate the manner in which 
congressional and presidential elections are conducted stems from the U.S. Constitution and 
“is not circumscribed by the Pennsylvania Constitution”). 
 74.  State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 279, 286–87 (Neb. 1948) (quoting NEB. CONST. 
art. I, § 22). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892)). 
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[t]he authority of the State legislature to prescribe the time, place and manner of 
holding elections for representatives in Congress, is derived from [the U.S. 
Constitution’s Elections Clause]. Their action on the subject is not an exercise of 
their general legislative authority under the Constitution of the State, but of an 
authority delegated by the Constitution of the United States . . . . The constitution 
and laws of this State are entirely foreign to the question, except so far as they 
are referred to and adopted by the Constitution of the United States.77 
Similarly, the Kentucky Court of Appeals noted that several 
other courts had upheld state laws authorizing absentee voting by 
military members, at least as applied to federal elections, despite 
state constitutional provisions requiring that all votes be cast in 
person.78
 
The court explained that, since a legislature’s power to 
regulate federal elections stems from the U.S. Constitution’s Elections 
Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, “the limitations and 
restrictions of the state constitutions (except so far as they may be 
expressly or by construction adopted by the U.S. Constitution, or 
Congressional legislation) are held not to apply” to elections for federal 
officers.79 
Both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate’s 
Committee on Privileges and Elections also have concluded that state 
constitutions cannot limit the power to regulate federal elections that 
the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause and Presidential Electors 
Clause grant to state legislatures. In 1866, in the election contest 
Baldwin v. Trowbridge,80 which the U.S. House of Representatives 
adjudicated according to its exclusive constitutional authority,81 the 
House concluded that a state constitution may not limit a 
legislature’s authority to enact laws governing the time, place, and 
manner of federal elections.82 
The Michigan Constitution contained a provision that the 
Michigan Supreme Court had construed as requiring people to cast 
their votes in person in the township or ward in which they resided.83
 
The Michigan legislature nevertheless passed a law contrary to this 
provision, allowing a qualified member of the military to vote 
 
 77.  In re Opinion of Justices, 45 N.H. 595, 601 (1864). 
 78.  See Commonwealth. ex rel. Dummit v. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691, 695 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1944). 
 79.  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 80.  Baldwin v. Trowbridge, 2 Bartlett Contested Election Cases, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 152, 
41st Cong., 2d Sess., 46, 47 (1866). 
 81.  See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 82.  2 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
§ 856 (1907), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-HPREC-HINDS-V2/pdf/GPO-
HPREC-HINDS-V2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/44NP-NVBV. 
 83.  Id.; see also People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 145–46 (1865) 
(Campbell, J.). 
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“whether at the time of voting he shall be within the limits of this 
State or not.”84 
After the law’s enactment, a congressional election was held. 
If votes from out-of-state members of the military were counted 
pursuant to the state statute, candidate Trowbridge would have been 
the winner.85 If such votes were excluded pursuant to the Michigan 
Constitution, then candidate Baldwin would have prevailed.86 The 
U.S. House Committee on Elections concluded that the Michigan 
Constitution could not limit the power of the legislature to regulate a 
federal election, and that the state law authorizing members of the 
military to vote absentee was therefore enforceable, notwithstanding 
the contrary provision of the Michigan Constitution.87 The U.S. 
House of Representatives, adopting the majority view of the 
Committee, voted to approve a resolution declaring Trowbridge the 
winner.88 
The House reaffirmed this conclusion in 1880 in approving the 
resolutions proposed by the House Committee on Elections in In re 
Holmes.89 The committee had stated, “[t]he provisions of the 
constitution of a State can not take th[e] power” to determine the time 
of elections for Members of Congress “from the legislature of a 
State . . . . [T]he time of electing Members of Congress cannot be 
prescribed by the constitution of a State, as against an act of the 
legislature . . . .”90
 
The House approved the committee ’s conclusion, 
reaffirming that “[t]he constitution of a State may not control its 
legislature in fixing under the U.S. Constitution, the time of election 
for Congressmen.”91 
The Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections reached a 
similar conclusion in a report concerning potential reforms to the 
Electoral College.92
 
The Committee explained that, by virtue of the 
U.S. Constitution’s grant of authority to state legislatures to regulate 




 84.  Baldwin, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 82. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 25–26. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  1 ASHER C. HINDS, HIND’S PRECEDENTS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, § 525 
(1907), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-HPREC-HINDS-V1/pdf/GPO-HPREC-
HINDS-V1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z652-7RJP.  
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id. 
 92.  S. Rep. No. 43-395, at 9 (1874). 
 93.  U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
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appointment of these electors is thus placed absolutely and wholly 
with the legislatures of the several States.”94
 
The Committee observed 
that this power: 
[C]annot be taken from [state legislatures] or modified by their State constitutions any 
more than can their power to elect Senators of the United States. Whatever provisions 
may be made by statute, or by the state constitution, to choose electors by the people, 
there is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it 
can neither be taken away nor abdicated.95 
Thus, state constitutional provisions may not be used as the 
basis for invalidating state laws as they apply to federal elections. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since the 1800s, most states have interpreted their 
constitutions to balance the two aspects of the right to vote: the 
“affirmative” right to cast a ballot, and the “defensive” right to have 
that ballot be given full effect, without dilution from fraudulent or 
invalid votes. In striking this balance, state courts have generally 
permitted legislatures to enact reasonable election rules and 
regulations so long as they do not disenfranchise people.  
This approach is functionally similar to the standard the 
Supreme Court later adopted in the Anderson-Burdick test. Under 
both the U.S. Constitution and most state constitutions, the fact that 
a person may be prohibited from voting (or permitted only to vote 
provisionally) if he or she fails to follow certain procedures or 
requirements neither constitutes voter disenfranchisement nor 
imposes impermissible new “qualifications” for voting. Thus, state 
constitutions generally do not provide a broader basis for 
challenging most types of election laws than the U.S. Constitution. 
Moreover, because a state legislature’s power to regulate federal 
elections stems directly from the U.S. Constitution, even if a state law 
violates a state constitutional provision, the law generally remains 
valid as applied to federal elections. 
 
 94.  S. Rep. No. 43-395, at 9 (1874). 
 95.  Id. (emphasis added); accord McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 34–35 (1892); see, e.g., 
Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811, 
835 (2001) (“Suppose, then, that the state constitution forbade felons to vote. If the legislature, 
operating under the authority granted it by Article II rather than by the state constitution, 
decided that this limitation should not apply in voting for presidential electors, the legislative 
choice should prevail.”); Emory Widener, Jr. ,  N ote , The Virginia Absent Voters System, 8 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 36, 37 (1951) (“The provision in the United States Constitution lodging in 
state legislatures the power to determine the manner in which [Members of Congress and 
presidential electors] shall be selected serves to protect absent voters statutes from restrictive 
regulations in state constitutions which might otherwise apply to these federal officers.”). 
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